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This paper highlights the increasing underreporting of remittances by 
the FIES compared to BSP and World Bank figures, advances possible 
reasons  why  such  underreporting  is  occurring,  and  examines  its 
implications for welfare measurement in the country at points in time 
and  across  time.  Using  simulation  exercises,  the  paper  finds  that 
indeed  the  „missing  remittances‟  in  the  FIES  could  be  causing  the 
mismeasurement  of  poverty  and  inequality  since  1997,  possibly 




1.  Introduction  
 
In the past decade, the Philippines has experienced what can be termed a growth-
welfare conundrum –  a situation where, one the one hand, the overall economy as 
measured by real per capita national income
2 from the national income accounts 
(NIA) has grown consistently, while on the other, the average individual standard-of-
living as measured by per capita income or expenditure according to the Family 
Income Expenditures Survey (FIES) has declined consistently (see Figure 1) with 
poverty levels practically unchanged or even increasing.
3  This has led observers to 
voice strong concerns about the quality of the data coming out of the country‟s 
statistical system and also about the distribution of the gains from the country‟s 
economic growth. 
 
Medalla and Jandoc (2008) suggest that economic growth from 1998 onwards as 
reported in the NIA is likely overestimated, after examining the internal consistency 
of the trends of the components of GDP and after comparing them with other data 
sources, including the FIES.  Balisacan (2008) and Monsod (2010) also note the 
possibility of problems with the data but suggest that the trend probably indicates that 
growth has been by-passing those in the lower income brackets.  Despite per capita 
GDP growth of 2.1 percent from 1997 to 2006, for instance, population poverty 
incidence is estimated to have increased by 1.7 percentage points during the period 
                                                 
1 PhD Candidate, UP School of Economics.  The author wishes to thank Dean Emmanuel de Dios of UPSE 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and for first pointing out to him the discrepancies in remittances 
figures that is the subject of this paper.  All errors are the author‟s own. 
2 The conundrum exists whether one uses per capita GDP or per capita GNP. 
3 Since per capita GDP and per capita household income do not measure exactly the same thing, divergence 
between the two is not impossible, although unlikely to be very wide and sustained over a long period as 
has been observed. using a poverty computation methodology that is consistent over time (Monsod 
2010).  Balisacan and Monsod also note, however, that if it were true that the growth 
in income has been accruing to those already well-off, it should have been the case 
that inequality is also on the rise.  But in fact the Gini ratio of per capita income
4 has 

























Here we posit another explanation for the divergence between NIA and FIES income 
growth, which is that the FIES from 1997 onwards has increasingly underestimated 
remittances from abroad, and thus total household income, even as the former has 
become a progressively larger part of the latter.  Note that this explanation is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the NIA itself being flawed or with the gains of 
economic growth being inequitably distributed.  By 2006, less than half of total 
remittances was reflected in the FIES.  The amount not captured is equivalent to Php 
438 billion, which would have accounted for 12.7 percent of total household income, 
7.3 percent of GDP, and more than three times the amount needed to raise all the poor 
out of poverty according to the official poverty lines.
5 
 
                                                 
4 This pertains to the population as opposed to households.  Households in the lower per capita income 
brackets tend to have larger family sizes. 
5 Monsod (2010) estimated the income gap, or the amount needed to raise all the poor out of poverty at Php 
120 billion in 2006 according to the official poverty lines and Php 73.3 billion according to the Cost-of-
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Figure 1. Real per capita income from the NIA and the FIES (1985 prices) 
Source of basic data: NSCB website and the Family Income and Expenditure Survey.  
Note: For consistency, per capita income and expenditure from the FIES were deflated using 
GDP deflators. The size of the missing remittances in the FIES since 1997 is substantial and could be 
affecting our measures of household welfare at any point in time.  But perhaps more 
importantly, because the size of the underestimation has been growing over time, 
even existing estimates of welfare changes since 1997 might not be robust.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses remittances 
data – its various sources and the increasing divergence between different estimates 
of remittances.  The third section advances possible reasons why the FIES has 
become less and less effective in estimating total remittances.  The fourth section 
examines the implications of the underestimation of remittances on the levels and 
trends of poverty and inequality under different assumptions as to the distribution of 
























2. Remittances Data 
 
The three main sources of total remittances data for the country are the Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the World Bank, and the National Statistics Office 
through the Family Income and Expenditure Survey.   
 
The BSP keeps a monthly record of the total cash remittances coming into the country 
through formal financial channels, such as commercial and thrift banks, foreign 
exchange corporations, and offshore banking units.   More recently, it has also been 
reporting total cash remittances, which include estimated remittances coursed through 
informal channels. BSP estimates for total remittances are available beginning 2001. 
Figure 2. Poverty Incidence and Per capita income Gini Ratio 
Source of basic data: Family Income and Expenditure Survey various years.  




















Poverty incidence (left axis) Gini ratio (right axis)The World Bank generates its own estimates of total annual remittances
6 using the 
balance of payments statistics of the International Monetary Fund.  It has remittances 
estimates for 210 countries from as early as 1970.  In the case of the Philippines, 
remittances data begin in 1977.   
 
The BSP figures on cash remittances coursed through formal channels are 
consistently lower than the World Bank estimates of total remittances. The only 
exception is 1998 but this could be due to the substantial movement of exchange rates 
during the year. Its estimates of total remittances have hovered at about 90 percent of 
the World Bank‟s estimates since 2002.   
 
The triennial FIES is another source of total remittances.  In its questionnaire, the 
FIES asks: Did you or any member of your family receive in cash any receipt, gift, or 
other assistance from abroad?  If the respondent answers this question in the 
affirmative, he/she is then asked to report how much of the following items the family 
received: 
 
a.  Cash received from family members who are contract workers 
b.  Cash received from family members who are working abroad 
c.  Pensions, retirement, workmen‟s compensation, and other benefits 
d.  Cash gifts, support, relief, etc. from abroad 
e.  Dividends from investment abroad 
 
Note that c and e, or pensions, retirement benefits and dividends from investments 
abroad do not fit the typical notion of what should be counted as remittances, but 
these are nevertheless almost always included when using the FIES to analyze 
remittances and its impact.  The primary reason studies include items c and e in 
remittances is that the NSO in its public use files provides the sum of a to e but not its 
individual components.  A special tabulation will have to be requested from the NSO 
to get the individual components.  In this paper, we also use the sum of the five items, 
being mindful that it is conceptually larger than what is typically meant by 
remittances; indeed it does not affect and in fact strengthens the point made that the 
FIES is substantially underestimating total remittances. 
 
Both the BSP and the World Bank figures on remittances are believed to be more 
accurate than the FIES estimates.  The FIES is, of course, subject to sampling error 
and is not specifically designed to generate an accurate measure of remittances.  The 
BSP figures on formal remittances are based on reported transactions by banks and 
other financial institutions under its supervision and should be more accurate.  But for 
years previous to 2001, BSP has no estimate of remittances that did not pass through 
the formal system.  The World Bank figures are ultimately based on BSP figures but 
adjusted to international measurement standards, including the addition of informal 
remittances.  In this paper we take the World Bank remittances figures as the 
                                                 
6 More precisely workers’ remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers.  Compensation 
of employees refers to the salaries of overseas workers with less than one year contract, which is presumed 
to be brought home after the end of the contract. benchmark against which the FIES falls short, first because it is more comparable, as 
the FIES is also supposed to capture informal remittances, and second because we 
analyze FIES data prior to 2001. 
 
 
2.1 Disparity in remittances figures 
 
From 1985 to 1991, the FIES remittances figures far exceeded those from the BSP 
and the World Bank, although the gap tended to decrease.  From 1997 to 2006, 
however, as remittances have grown by leaps and bounds, the FIES estimates have 
increasingly fallen below the BSP and World Bank figures. 
  
The 1985 FIES estimated total remittances to be US$1.4 billion
7 whereas the BSP 
pegged total formal cash remittances
8 for the year at US$ 687 million, and the World 
Bank put total cash remittances at US$ 806 million.  Alternatively put, the FIES 
remittance figure in 1985 was 202 percent of the BSP figure and 176 percent of the 
World Bank figure (see Figure 3, see Annex Table 1 for the actual numbers).  Note 
that because the BSP remittance figure covers only those coursed through the formal 
financial system, it was not inconsistent for it to be lower than the FIES estimate.  
The share of remittances going through the informal system is believed to have been 
very high in the 1980s but to have substantially declined to the present, given the 
wider availability of banks and other financial institutions offering remittance 
services and the declining costs of those services. That the World Bank figure is 
higher than both the FIES estimate and the BSP figure is a sign of inconsistency, 
however, since WB figures are supposed to already incorporate informal and formal 
remittances. 
 
In 1988, the FIES remittances estimate was US$1.5 billion, which was 177 percent of 
the BSP figure and 120 percent of the World Bank figure.  In 1991, the FIES estimate 
was US$ 2.4 billion, which was 159 percent and 129 percent of BSP and World Bank 
figures, respectively.  In 1994, the FIES estimate was 122 percent and 90 percent of 
those of the BSP and World Bank, respectively.  This was the closest the three 
sources would get to each other.  
 
2 Missing remittances 
 
In the four FIES runs from 1997 to 2006, estimated total remittances declined as a 
percentage of BSP figures from 70 percent to 53 percent, and as a percentage of 
World Bank estimates from 59 percent to 44 percent.  This occurred even as 
remittances assumed an ever-larger share in total household income.  The share of 
remittances in total household income has increased from 8 percent in 1994 to 11.5 
percent in 2006.  If one boldly assumes that the World Bank figures are the „true‟ 
levels of remittances, then the figures are even starker.  Adding the „missing 
remittances‟, or the difference between the World Bank and FIES remittances figures, 
                                                 
7 Php 25.8 billion at the average exchange rate for the year of Php18.6 per US dollar. 
8 Formal cash remittances is just short hand for cash remittances through the formal financial system. in computing the share of remittances
9 in total household income will show it to have 
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Figure 3. FIES Remittances as %age of BSP and WB estimates of Total Remittances 
Source of basic data: FIES various years, BSP, World Bank estimates as of November 2009 
Note: FIES estimates, which were in pesos, were converted into dollars using the average exchange 
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Reported Remittances only Including Missing remittances
Figure 4. Remittances as percentage of total household income in the FIES 
Source of basic data: FIES various years  
 
Both the volume and the share in total household income of the „missing remittances‟ 
have been increasing over time.  In 2006, „missing remittances‟ were equivalent to 
Php 438 billion or 12.7 percent of total household income.  As already stated, this is 
more than three times the estimated income gap in 2006 using the official poverty 
lines.  While it is of course highly unlikely that the „missing remittances‟ would have 
gone exactly to those who fall below the poverty line, it is possible their exclusion 
may have resulted in the mismeasurement of welfare levels at points in time and of 
changes in welfare levels over time.   A crucial element in this is the hypothetisized 
distribution of the missing remittances across income groups. 
 
3.  Possible Reasons for Missing Remittances 
 
Why might the FIES have become less able to capture the total remittances coming in 
to the country?  This paper suggests three possible explanations.  First is the rise of 
electronic banking since the late 1990s.  Second, related to the first, is the increasing 
amount of remittances that go towards the purchase of real estate, payments for which 
are difficult for household surveys to capture.  And third is the undercounting of 
overseas workers in the household surveys, which may partly be due to the rise in the 
number of overseas workers that do not properly belong to any households in the 
country but who still remit their money to local banks. 
 
3.1 Rise of electronic banking 
 
A handful of banks started offering electronic banking services in the country 
beginning in the late 1990s.  Electronic banking refers to the provision of retail 
banking products through electronic channels such as phones and the internet.  In 
May 2000, the Bangko Sentral, through Circular No. 240, began requiring all banks 
providing such services to first get clearance from BSP.  The number of banks that 
provided electronic banking services grew from 5 in 2000, to 36 in 2003, to 73 in 
2006, and to 99 in 2009 (see Figure 5).  Of the most recent total, 32 were commercial 
banks, 15 were thrift banks, and 52 were rural and cooperative banks.  Since 2005, 
there has been especially rapid growth in the provision of electronic banking services 
by rural and cooperative banks. 
 
Electronic banking has made it much easier for overseas workers to have greater 
control over their money and the amount and frequency of remittance they send their 
households.  Overseas workers can have their salaries sent to their personal bank 
accounts, which they can access through the internet or through mobile phones, to 
either transfer some of it to another bank account (a spouse‟s or a parent‟s perhaps) or 
to an electronic money account (such as Smart Communication‟s Smart Money or 
Globe Telecommunications‟ G-Cash).  Because the FIES only asks for the remittance 
that the household received, it fails to capture remittances that go directly into the 
overseas worker‟s personal bank account and which do not get transferred to the 


























3.2 Real estate purchases by overseas workers 
 
While there is yet no industry-wide publicly available data to support it, it is a widely 
held belief that overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) comprise a large part of the market 
for real estate, especially new condominiums.  By some estimates, OFWs account for 
about 60-70 percent of new condominium purchases.
10  This seems to be borne out by 
the marketing strategies of real estate companies that appear to focus heavily on 
overseas workers.
11  If this is indeed the case, because of the large number of 
condominium units being produced and sold (e.g. see Figure 6), and the typical 
manner of payment for such units, this could be another reason that the FIES has been 
increasingly underestimating remittances.  Condominium units are usually pre-sold 
and payments are in the form of postdated checks.  If OFWs pay for their purchased 
units by putting money in their checking accounts directly (perhaps by making inter-
account transfers through the internet) without going through their households, then 
this is unlikely to be captured by the FIES.   
                                                 
10 One can also get an idea of how many OFWs are purchasing condominium units by browsing through the 
entries in online bulletin boards on real estate such as www.skyscrapercity.com. 
11 For instance, Ayala Land Inc. has a separate arm - Ayala Land International Sales, Inc. – to market and 
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Commercial Thrift Rural and Cooperative
Figure 5. No. of banks cleared by BSP to provide electronic banking services 
Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas  
Note: It was only in 2000, through Circular No. 240 dated 5 May 2000, that the BSP required 
banks to get prior clearance before providing electronic banking services, although a handful 






















According to the FIES 2006, total expenses for that year by all households on the 
purchase and amortization of real property, the construction of new houses, and major 
repair of houses amounted to Php62 billion or about US$1.2 billion at the then-
prevailing exchange rate.  This was far below what was expected to have been spent 
on real estate just from the remittances of overseas workers alone.
12 Major developer 
Ayala Land Inc. (ALI), in its 2007 Annual Report, stated that overseas-based 
Filipinos accounted for 16 percent of its residential sales in 2004, 26 percent in 2005, 
37 percent in 2006, and 32 percent in 2007.
13  In 2007, ALI valued its residential 
sales to overseas Filipinos at Php 6 billion.  Megaworld Corp. reported in its 2007 
Annual report that about 10 percent of its residential sales were made overseas. 
 
3.3 Undercounting of overseas workers in household surveys 
 
Another possible reason for undercounting remittances, not entirely distinct from 3.1 
but rather reinforces it, is that household surveys undercount the overseas workers 
themselves.  Household surveys are unable to capture adults who lived on their own 
before they migrated for work nor do they enumerate couples who both migrated for 
work, the latter especially if they did not leave any children behind.  If such people 
                                                 
12 An executive from a major real estate company was quoted by a newspaper as saying that they used the 
rule of thumb that 30 percent of remittances are spent on the real estate sector. Using the World Bank 2006 
remittances figure of US$15 billion, this is equivalent to US$4.5 billion.  (Source: „OFW Remittances 
Fuelling Growth in Real Estate‟ in the 5 May 2007 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.) 
13 The figures pertain to buyers who gave an overseas address at the time of purchase and do not include 
overseas Filipino workers who may have bought units at a time they were in the Philippines – for vacation, 
























No. of Bldgs. (left axis) Flr. Area in sq meters (right axis) 
Figure 6. Number and floor are of new condominium buildings started in Metro Manila 
Source of basic data: NSO Industry Division, Industry and Trade Statistics Department remit money to the country, then such remittances will not be captured by household 
surveys.  The sheer volume of migration over the last decade suggests than overseas 
workers with such profiles are probably on the rise.  
 
4. Possible Impact of Missing Remittances on Welfare Measurement 
 
In 1997, 2003, and 2006, the size of what we have termed missing remittances in the 
FIES exceeded the sum of the income shortfall of the poor from the poverty line (see 
Figure 7).  In 2000, missing remittances were equivalent to 89 percent of the income 
shortfall of the poor.  In the highly unlikely event that the missing remittances in 
actuality went to those classified as „poor‟ and distributed in a certain way, then it 
would have wiped out or substantially reduced poverty and considerably reduced 
inequality.  On the other extreme, if all the missing remittances went only to the non-
poor, there would be no impact on poverty but inequality would be much higher.
14  
These two scenarios only underscore the crucial point that how much the inclusion of 
the missing remittances affects welfare measures depends on how we assume they are 
distributed across income groups. 
 
The assumption that presents itself most readily, and the one pursued in this section, 
is that the missing remittances would have been distributed among the various income 
groups in the same way as the captured remittances.  This is convenient in the 
absence of anything stronger to guide us, although it should be kept in mind that is a 
weak assumption.  In truth, we do not have a good idea at the moment as to how the 
missing remittances are distributed, and it could very well be that they are very 
differently distributed compared to the captured remittances both with respect to the 
income groups to which they accrue, and the expenditure items for which they are 
used.  
 
The explanations we put forward for the missing remittances centered on 
technological changes in banking services.  If one supposes that higher income 
groups are those more likely to adopt new technology, then it can be argued that most 
of the missing remittances really go to the higher income groups, whether to a lesser 
or greater extent than the captured remittances, one cannot say.  Still, another school 
of thought says that new technology, such as mobile phone banking, are more likely 
to be embraced by those in the rural areas, and thus by relatively poorer households, 
on the premise that they have a smaller attachment to existing technology to which 
they may have little or no access to, and that new technology represent relatively 
higher cost savings for them.
15 
 
                                                 
14 It can also be argued that additional remittances may be more biased towards the upper middle deciles 
rather than either extreme of the income distribution, since education is correlated with migration, which 
leaves out the very poor, while, on the other hand, having other valuable assets domestically, makes it less 
likely for the very rich to migrate.  Why this pattern is not observed for captured remittances is the puzzle.  
It maybe that what we mean by the very rich is not the tenth decile itself but only a small fraction of it. 
15 This is especially true in the poorer provinces where commercial banks are typically concentrated in the 
provincial capital. This issue has potentially serious implications for the many studies on remittances 
using nationally-representative household survey data, such as the FIES, the Annual 
Poverty Indicators Surveys, and the Survey of Overseas Filipinos.  Studies based on 
the data sets mentioned, such as those on the motives behind remittances, the uses of 
remittances (e.g, whether for investment or consumption, the types of consumption), 
and even the welfare impact of remittances, presuppose that the remittances captured 
by these household surveys are representative of all remittances.  If that turns out not 
be the case, or if the missing remittances are very differently distributed from 
captured remittances, then it potentially invalidates inferences based on these data.  In 
fact, a stronger point can be made – even if missing remittances are distributed in the 
same way as captured remittances, level measures (such as how much of remittances 
goes to specific spending categories like education or health or entrepreneurial 
activities, or savings from remittances, and remittance elasticities) based only on the 

























4.1 Impact of missing remittances on measures of poverty and inequality 
 
To examine whether the missing remittances have potentially caused a 
mismeasurement of welfare levels at points in time and of welfare changes over time, 
we undertake simple simulation exercises using the various FIES rounds (1997-
2006).  The simulations involve adding the missing remittances across the different 
income groups and investigating the impact of doing so on poverty and inequality.   
 


















1997 2000 2003 2006
Income Shortfall of Poor Missing Remittances
Source of basic data: Family Income and Expenditure Survey various years.  
Note: The income shortfall of Php 128 Bn computed for 2006 is different from the Php 120 Bn cited in 
Section 1 from the paper of Monsod (2010) because the computations here used a single national 
poverty line while that paper used provincial poverty lines.  Poverty lines used were Php 9,718 for 1997, 
Php 11,458 for 2000, Php 12,309 for 2003, and Php 15,057 for 2006. We try three scenarios: the first assumes that, for each FIES year, missing remittances 
are distributed in exactly the same way across the per capita income deciles as 
captured remittances; the second, that missing remittances are distributed across the 
per capita income deciles as captured remittances in the year when the captured 
remittances were most equitably distributed
16;  the third, that missing remittances are 
distributed across the per capita income deciles as the captured remittances in the year 
when the captured remittances were least equitably distributed. Using the Gini Ratio 
as the measure of inequality, Table 1 shows that captured remittances were most 
equitably distributed in 1997 and least equitable in 2003.  Note that even at its most 
equitable, captured remittances were still very inequitably distributed, with only 1.4 
percent going to the poorest three deciles and only 5 percent going to the bottom half 
of the population.   Schooling qualifications make it unlikely for overseas workers to 
come from very poor households.  Ducanes and Abella (2008) estimate that only 2.6 
percent of overseas workers come from the bottom quintile of households ordered by 
per capita income, and that only 8 percent come from the bottom two quintiles.  
 
 
Table 1. Decile Share in Captured Remittances, 1994-2006 
Per capita income  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006 
1 (Poorest)  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
2  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3 
3  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.7 
4  1.3  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.1 
5  2.3  2.2  2.0  2.0  2.1 
6  3.5  4.0  3.4  3.4  3.3 
7  6.0  7.6  5.7  6.1  5.9 
8  10.1  11.7  10.5  11.1  10.5 
9  21.3  21.0  21.4  18.2  19.0 
10 (Richest)  54.1  50.8  55.1  57.2  57.1 
Total Remittances  
(Php Bn)  85  119  188  240  345 
           
Gini ratio  71.8  69.6  73.3  73.7  73.7 
Source of basic data: FIES various years 
Note: a) Decile refers to population deciles (as opposed to HH deciles) 
         b) Gini computed using PovCal software 
 
 
Departing somewhat from recommended practice, income instead of expenditure is 
used in the measurement of welfare. This is mainly for convenience: remittances are a 
component of income and it is straightforward to add the missing remittances to total 
income; using expenditures will require additional assumptions to be made regarding 
how much of remittances go into consumption for different income groups.  A case 
could be made that consumption should not be as underestimated as income as a 
result of the missing remittances, especially if most of the missing remittances go into 
bank savings.  However, it still could be that some remittance-related consumption, 
                                                 
16 In the case of remittances, the phrase „least inequitably distributed‟ is probably more apt. such as for real property, are not being counted accurately, as seems to be indicated 
by the gap between the FIES 2006 figure on real property expenditures and industry 
estimates cited in Section 3.2.  In other words, the findings here could still be 
relevant, even if to a lesser degree, for welfare measures based on consumption. 
 
The software Povcal, developed and used by the World Bank, is used to generate the 
poverty (incidence, depth and severity) and inequality (Gini ratio) measures.  Povcal 
is used because it allows for the estimation of poverty and inequality using grouped 
distributional data (e.g. deciles and decile shares in total income) as opposed to unit 
record data (such as the entire FIES).  Using unit record data would have entailed 
specifying how much each household gets out of the missing remittances, which 
would require additional assumptions, such as, for instance, that the missing 
remittances go to exactly the same households where the captured remittances go to.    
Estimates of poverty and inequality using unit record data and grouped distributional 
data for large data sets (such as the FIES) are typically close enough for the 





Scenario 1: Missing remittances distributed identically as captured remittances 
 
Figure 8 compares poverty for the case when unadjusted income is used versus the 
case when missing remittances are added to income and assumed distributed in the 
same way as captured remittances.  It is clear that poverty is consistently lower when 
the missing remittances are added, but more interestingly, that the difference between 
the measured poverty levels grows over time.  The difference between the measured 
poverty incidences in 1997 was half of a percentage point (32.3 versus 31.8) but this 
rises to 1.2 percentage points in 2006 (32.1 versus 30.9).  As a consequence whereas 
poverty incidence is virtually the same for 1997 and 2006 using unadjusted income, it 
is clearly lower using adjusted income.  To a lesser extent, the same pattern is 
observed for poverty depth and severity.  It should be noted, however, that the general 
pattern of poverty is the same in both cases – increasing from 1997 to 2000, declining 
from 2000 to 2003, and increasing from 2003 to 2006. 
 
Scenario 2: Missing remittances distributed as most equitable observed captured 
remittances 
 
Figure 9 shows poverty when missing remittances are added to income but this time 
they are assumed to be distributed in the same way as the captured remittances in 
1997 – the year when the Gini ratio of captured remittances was lowest.  For 
comparison, poverty when income is unadjusted is also in the graph.  As in Scenario 
1, poverty is consistently lower with the adjusted income.  However, there is a 
difference in the pattern observed.  Using the adjusted income results in poverty 
actually declining from 1997 to 2000 instead of rising as observed using the 
unadjusted income.  There‟s a 1.6 percentage point difference in the poverty 
                                                 
17 See Annex Table 2 for the numbers that go into Figures 8-11. incidence between the two measures in 2000 (32.9 minus 31.3) and a 1.5 percentage 
point difference in 2006 (32.1 minus 30.6). 
 
Scenario 3: Missing remittances distributed as most equitable observed captured 
remittances 
 
Figure 10 shows aspects of poverty when missing remittances are added to income 
but assumed to be distributed in the same way as the captured remittances in 2003 – 
the year when the Gini ratio of captured remittances was highest.  The results are very 
similar to Scenario 1 and the pattern similar to what has been observed using the 
unadjusted income.  As in Scenario 1, the gap in poverty measures when using the 




Figure 11 shows the Gini ratio from 1997 to 2006 using the unadjusted income and 
the incomes using the three types adjustments described above.  The Gini ratio for 
unadjusted income shows a sustained decline in inequality (from a Gini ratio of 50.5 
in 1997 to 48.3 in 2006).  In contrast, the Gini ratios using the adjusted incomes show 
inequality to be more or less unchanged from 1997 to 2006 (Gini ratio around 51 to 
52).  Under the assumption that missing and captured remittances are distributed 
similarly, then it is deinitely underestimating both the level of inequality and its 
change over time.  By 2006, the Gini ratio could be off by as much as 3 percentage 
points. 
 
4.2 Simulated Generalized Lorenz Curves  
 
In this subsection, we construct generalized Lorenz curves as a means to further 
examine whether the missing remittances in the FIES impacts our measurement of 
intertemporal welfare changes.   
 
As in the standard Lorenz curve, the generalized Lorenz curve (Shorrocks, 1983) has 
for the x-axis the cumulative proportion of the population.  The y-axis measures the 
cumulative mean income of the population (ordered from lowest to highest income) 
over the total population.  The crucial thing is that if one generalized Lorenz curve 
dominates (is consistently above) another, under the assumption that for social 
welfare greater income is more desirable to lesser income and that higher inequality is 
undesirable, then the dominant generalized Lorenz curve represents higher social 
welfare.  When the generalized Lorenz curves intersect, no definite conclusion can be 






Figure 8. Poverty with missing remittances added and assumed 
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Source of basic data: FIES various years  
Figure 9. Poverty with missing remittances added and assumed 
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Source of basic data: FIES various years Figure 10. Poverty with missing remittances added and assumed 
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Figure 12 shows the generalized Lorenz curves for each three-year period from 1997-
2006 and for the entire period using the unadjusted income (left column) and the 
income adjusted by adding remittances, which are assumed distributed in the same 
way as captured remittances for each year (right column).  Both sets of graphs agree 
that a reduction in social welfare – in the sense of income equity – occurred in 1997-
2000, that an increase in social welfare occurred in 2000-2003, with no definite 
conclusion possible for the period 2000-2003 – the curves intersect at the beginning 
of the second decile.
 18   However, for the entire period 1997-2006, the generalized 
Lorenz curves using unadjusted income allow no conclusion to be drawn regarding 
the change in social welfare, while those using adjusted incomes indicate an 
unambiguous improvement.  This is another indication we may be mismeasuring 
welfare changes over time as a result of the missing remittances. 
                                                 
18 When the curves are too near each other, it can be hard to check the dominance.  See Annex Table 3 for 
the numbers used to generate Figure 12.  
Figure 11. Gini ratio using adjusted and unadjusted per capita income 
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Missing remittances added, distributed as least equitable observed 
Figure 12. Generalized Lorenz Curves, unadjusted and adjusted per capita incomes 
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Source of basic data: FIES various years 
Notes: a) 1997 base prices with incomes adjusted using the inflation  implicit in the poverty thresholds;  b) the missing remittances were 
assumed distributed the same way as the captured remittances; c) see Annex Table 2 for the numbers that go into the graphs.  
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper highlights the increasing underreporting of remittances by the FIES as 
another reason for the divergence in the measured standard of living over the past 
decade when looking at the National Income Accounts and the FIES.  This is in 
addition to reasons previously put forward, such as that the NIA is overestimating 
growth and that the non-poor are cornering the gains from economic growth.  The 
paper shows that, by 2006, the remittances missed by the FIES accounted for more 
than half of total remittances as estimated by the World Bank and amounted to more 
than three times the total income shortfall of the poor using official poverty lines. 
 
The paper suggests three reasons why remittances are being undercounted. The first is 
the rise of electronic banking, which has allowed overseas workers to remit their 
earnings to personal bank accounts that they can manage from abroad and thus 
dispense with the need to remit everything to their households. The second is the 
substantial portion of remittances that go to real property expenditures, the payment 
for which may skip the overseas workers‟ households. And third, not distinct but 
reinforcing the first reason, the possibly rising number of overseas workers who have 
not left any household behind, either because they were on their own before they 
migrated, or because all members of their households have migrated for work. 
 
The large and growing size of missing remittances in the FIES and other household 
surveys linked to it, such as the SOF and the APIS, has serious implications for the 
validity of the findings of many studies on remittances (the motives behind 
remittances, their uses, their impact) that use these data sets, presupposing the 
representativeness of their remittances figures.  This makes it vital to try and 
understand the nature of the missing remittances, particularly to which households 
they go and what they are used for. 
 
Simulations show that under conservative assumptions about how the missing 
remittances are distributed across income groups, we could be mismeasuring poverty 
levels and, possibly, its direction of change for some periods.  The mismeasurement 
appears especially severe for inequality where including the missing remittances 
shows inequality being basically unchanged since 1997, whereas its non-inclusion 
results in apparently declining inequality.  Simulations using generalized Lorenz 
curves also show that conclusions about changes in social welfare, particularly over 
long periods, could be affected by the inclusion of the missing remittances. 
 
Missing remittances alone will not explain the divergence between per capita income 
as measured in the NIA and FIES.  Even with the missing remittances included, per 
capita income growth in the FIES is still significantly lower than in the NIA.  It is 
possible that, as has been suggested elsewhere, the NIA is overestimating growth, that 
very little of the growth is going to the poor and thus not impacting poverty very 
much, and that, as suggested here, the FIES is underestimating income through 
remittances –all at the same time.   
The world sometimes changes at a pace faster than one‟s capacity to measure it.  If 
household surveys have indeed become deficient in measuring remittances and 
perhaps migration, it is not a problem unique to the Philippines.  For instance, 
Thailand quite recently tried to measure the number of migrant workers entering its 
territory and the amount of remittances crossing its borders using its labor force 
survey, but since a large portion of its migrant workers lived in factories and not 
households, and many, because they were there in the country illegally hid from the 
people doing the survey, they were missed by the survey, resulting in serious 
underestimation of both remittances and migration level. 
 
There does not seem to be an obvious or easy fix.  In the future conduct of household 
surveys, however, questions regarding migration and remittances can be more 
probing (e.g., “Do you know if the overseas worker in the household keeps a personal 
bank account to which he/she remits money and to which you have no access to?”,  
“Do you know if the overseas worker in the household has purchased real property 
that he/she is paying for directly?”, “Do you know any relative who has gone to work 
overseas and who at the time he/she migrated was living by himself”, etc.) just to get 
a better grasp of how remittances are being missed.  Meanwhile, perhaps the least that 
can be done is to factor into our analysis the possible deficiencies in our data, and to 
temper our conclusions accordingly.  
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Annex Table 1. Remittances to the Philippines according to the FIES, BSP, and World Bank 
Year  FIES (Php Mn)  FIES (US$ Mn) 
Bangko Sentral 
(US$ Mn) 
World Bank (US$ 
Mn) 
 
1985  25,775  1,385  687  806   
1986      680  861   
1987      792  1,020   
1988  32,050  1,519  857  1,262   
1989      973  1,362   
1990      1,181  1,465   
1991  65,473  2,383  1,500  1,850   
1992      2,202  2,538   
1993      2,230  2,587   
1994  84,840  3,212  2,630  3,452   
1995      4,878  5,360   
1996      4,307  4,875   
1997  118,642  4,026  5,742  6,799   
1998      7,368  5,130   
1999      6,795  6,918   
2000  187,706  4,247  6,050  6,212   
2001      6,031  6,164   
2002      6,886  9,735   
2003  239,829  4,425  7,578  10,243   
2004      8,550  11,471   
2005      10,689  13,566   
2006  344,629  6,716  12,761  15,251   
2007      14,450  16,302   
2008      17,348  18,643   
2009e           19,411   
Note: FIES remittances were converted to US dollar using the average exchange rate for 
the year as reported by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.   
  
Annex Table 2.  Poverty and Inequality using the unadjusted income and 
income adjusted for the missing remittances 
   Poverty 
Gini     Incidence  Depth  Severity 
FIES unadjusted             
1997  32.3  10.7  4.6  50.5 
2000  32.9  11.0  4.7  50.4 
2003  30.3  9.9  4.2  49.1 
2006  32.1  10.3  4.3  48.3 
         
FIES w/ missing remittances distributed as captured   
1997  31.8  10.5  4.5  51.3 
2000  32.6  10.9  4.7  51.3 
2003  29.4  9.6  4.1  51.8 
2006  30.9  9.9  4.1  51.4 
         
FIES w/ missing remittances distributed as most equitable captured 
1997  31.8  10.5  4.5  51.3 
2000  31.3  10.2  4.3  50.4 
2003  29.1  9.5  4.0  51.3 
2006  30.6  9.8  4.1  50.9 
         
FIES w/ missing remittances distributed as least equitable captured    
1997   31.9  10.6  4.5  51.5 
2000  32.5  10.9  4.7  51.3 
2003  29.4  9.6  4.1  51.8 
2006  30.9  10.0  4.1  51.4 
Source of basic data: FIES various years 
  
Annex Table 2.  Cumulative Mean per capita Income by 
Cumulative Popn Decile 
Unadjusted Income 
Cumulative Popn 
Decile  1997  2000  2003  2006 
10  426  424  434  440 
20  1,067  1,054  1,100  1,093 
30  1,894  1,866  1,966  1,931 
40  2,927  2,889  3,053  2,971 
50  4,212  4,167  4,402  4,261 
60  5,829  5,769  6,096  5,875 
70  7,895  7,823  8,260  7,930 
80  10,609  10,543  11,090  10,638 
90  14,469  14,423  15,083  14,504 
100  24,073  23,875  24,359  23,129 
              
With Missing Remittances 
Cumulative Popn 
Decile  1997  2000  2003  2006 
10  428  425  436  444 
20  1,074  1,058  1,111  1,107 
30  1,909  1,875  1,997  1,968 
40  2,957  2,907  3,114  3,044 
50  4,267  4,205  4,527  4,404 
60  5,929  5,838  6,330  6,129 
70  8,080  7,945  8,687  8,381 
80  10,926  10,764  11,869  11,441 
90  15,023  14,846  16,441  15,949 
100  25,199  24,817  27,537  26,498 
Source of basic data: FIES various years 
 